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Background: Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are 
frequently not an option in evaluation practice, which is why 
evaluators switch to non-experimental methods–such as the 
“counterfactual as self-estimated by program participants” 
(CSEPP) for estimating intervention effects. Unfortunately, no 
systematic attempt has been made to test under what 
conditions CSEPP provides valid estimates.  
 
Purpose: As a first step in this direction, this research 
compared the performance of CSEPP in terms of bias when 
applied in various groups of participants with various levels of 
education, when used for assessing the effects on various 
outcome variables, and when employed with various 




Intervention: The treatment used in this research was a short 
educational video, in which the audience is informed about 
important concepts and aspects of organ donation. 
 
 
Research Design:  Because investigating bias in CSEPP is 
difficult at participant level, a series of 40 trials was conducted 
and bias was analyzed at trial-level. For each trial, the effect 
of the same treatment was estimated by CSEPP and 
compared with the effect estimated by a simultaneously 
conducted RCT. Afterwards, we analyzed differences 
between CSEPP and experimental results as a function of the 
conditions under which the single trials took place. Despite 
small sample sizes of the single trials, the meta-analysis was 
sufficiently powered to detect even small differences 
between CSEPP and RCT. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: The data was collected via 
online surveys on a crowdsourcing portal. For data analysis, 
we applied meta-analytic methods such as random-effects 
meta-analysis and meta-regression. 
 
Findings: Results show that CSEPP provided accurate effect 
estimates, no matter under what conditions the method was 
applied.    
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Generally, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are 
thought to serve best for the purpose of estimating 
causal intervention effects. Unfortunately, RCTs 
are not always feasible in evaluation practice–for 
example because evaluators are not consulted until 
an intervention has already started (Shadish, Cook, 
& Campbell, 2002) or due to budget constraints–
which is why evaluators instead often apply non-
experimental methods for assessing intervention 
effects.    
A recently introduced approach, denoted as the 
“counterfactual as self-estimated by program 
participants” (CSEPP; Mueller, Gaus, & Rech, 2014; 
Mueller & Gaus, 2015), capitalizes on people’s 
ability to think counterfactually (e.g., Roese & 
Olson, 2014) and builds on the idea that 
intervention participants are capable of directly 
estimating their counterfactual scenario, that is, the 
state they would have been in after an intervention 
without having participated. In previous studies it 
was found that CSEPP worked relatively well for 
assessing the effects of communicative 
interventions on various types of self-reported 
attitude and behavioral intention (Mueller, Gaus, & 
Rech, 2014; Mueller and Gaus, 2015).      
Basically, the utility of CSEPP for evaluation 
practice depends on its scope and possible 
applications. Unfortunately, so far no systematic 
attempt has been made to investigate whether 
CSEPP provides reliable estimates of treatment 
effects under various conditions. If the method 
failed to do so, it would be less useful for application 
in evaluation practice. In any case, evaluators 
should be aware of potential limitations of CSEPP. 
Thus, as a first step in this direction, this research 
compared the performance of CSEPP in terms of 
bias when it is applied in various groups of 
participants with different levels of education, for 
assessing the effects on various outcome variables, 
and with various degrees fo proximity of current 
and self-estimated counterfactual ratings within 
the questionairre. We compared groups with 
various levels of education, and assessed the effects 
on various outcome variables, and with various 
degrees of proximity of current and self-estimated 
counterfactual ratings within the questionnaire. 
Because investigating bias in CSEPP studies is 
difficult at the participant level, a series of 40 small 
trials was conducted and bias was analyzed at the 
trial level using meta-analysis. Each trial included 
the same treatment, an educational film about 
organ donation which is similar to many videos 
published on the web (e.g., Tian, 2010) and used by 
health insurance companies or health education 
organizations for informing people about the issue. 
For each of the trials, a treatment effect was 
estimated by CSEPP and compared with the effect 
estimated by a simultaneously conducted RCT. 
Afterwards, an analysis was made of whether 
differences in estimated treatment effects between 
CSEPP and RCT across the trials could be explained 
by variation in participants’ level of education, 
variation in outcome variables, and variation in the 
order of the questions within the questionnaire.  
This paper is organized as follows: First, we 
describe the conceptual background of CSEPP and 
present the propositions guiding this research. 
Subsequently, we present the data and the methods 
employed, describe and discuss the observed 
results, and conclude by considering issues of 




According to the potential outcome model (Rubin, 
1979; Holland, 1986), a causal effect is the 
difference in an outcome variable Y between a 
participant after having received the treatment and 
the same person under the same conditions without 
having received it. However, only one of the two 
states can be observed at a given point in time. In 
order to deal with this problem, evaluators 
frequently employ control groups for 
approximating the state in which participants 
would have been without having been exposed to 
the treatment. This state is frequently referred to as 
the counterfactual.  
In contrast to RCTs or nonequivalent 
comparison group designs, CSEPP relies on 
participants’ self-estimation of the hypothetical 
counterfactual as an approximation of the true but 
non-observable counterfactual. In practice, the 
approach works quite simply (Mueller, Gaus, & 
Rech, 2014): first, participants are asked to provide 
information about the outcome variable Y after 
having participated in an intervention. Secondly, 
they are asked to provide information about what Y 
would have been like under the condition of not 
having participated. The difference between these 
current and counterfactual ratings is employed as 
an estimate of the treatment effect on the treated. 
Therefore, similar to the application of 
retrospective pretest methodology (Farel, Umble, & 
Polhamus, 2001; Skeff, Stratos, & Bergen, 1992), 
using CSEPP relies solely on the self-assessments of 
participants after having participated in the 
intervention. However, CSEPP differs from 
retrospective pretests because participants 
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estimate a hypothetical state in the present rather 
than attempting to reconstruct the past (Mueller, 
Gaus, & Rech, 2014). Despite this difference, in 
CSEPP respondents may also use retrospective 
thinking to estimate their own counterfactual by 
thinking back to what their state in the outcome Y 
was prior to the intervention.  
Following Mueller, Gaus, and Rech (2014), 
however, participants may also employ 
counterfactual thinking (Roese & Olson, 2014; 
Roese, 1997) as a strategy for estimating their own 
counterfactual in Y. This involves a participant 
mentally creating possible alternatives to events 
that have already occurred in the past. By applying 
CSEPP, participants are asked directly about such 
an alternative event, namely their state in Y without 
having participated in the intervention. In 
answering the question, participants may mentally 
simulate various possible alternatives to their 
current outcome in Y after participation and choose 
the most likely alternative as an estimate of their 
counterfactual. 
Generally, using the difference between current 
and self-estimated counterfactual ratings of 
participants in Y as an estimate for the causal 
intervention effect may be biased because of 
participants’ over- or under-estimation of the true 
but non-observable counterfactual. Given that the 
counterfactual is a scenario in which participants 
have never actually been, it seems reasonable to 
assume that there is some deviation between self-
estimated and true counterfactuals. This bias–
which equals the difference between the true 
treatment effect on a participant and the treatment 
effect on the same person estimated by CSEPP–is 
denoted as self-estimation bias (SEB) (Mueller, 




At the moment, there is no evidence about exactly 
how SEB is determined or under what conditions 
CSEPP provides valid effect estimates. However, we 
do distinguish three dimensions on which varying 
conditions could alter the performance of CSEPP, 
namely characteristics of participants, attributes 
and focus of the intervention, and characteristics of 
the method used for data collection. Because 
resources for a research project like this are limited 
and the number of conditions under which CSEPP 
may perform better or worse is not, we selected one 
variable from each of the three dimensions to be 
further investigated with respect to their effects on 
the performance of CSEPP. Precisely, we assessed 
whether manipulating three independent 
variables–representing various conditions under 
which CSEPP is applied–leads to variation in SEB 
or not. In the section that follows, we present our 
assumptions about the relationships between the 
independent variables and SEB and introduce the 
corresponding research propositions.  
 
Dimension 1: Individual Characteristics 
 
First, variation in individuals’ characteristics may 
be responsible for varying magnitudes of SEB in 
CSEPP studies (Mueller & Gaus, 2015). Such 
characteristics could be, for example, cognitive 
abilities, prior participation in similar 
interventions, prior experiences with the topic of 
the intervention, pre-conceptions of the treatment, 
or socio-economic variables.  
In this study, we focus on investigating whether 
the validity of treatment effects estimated by 
CSEPP differs between groups of participants with 
various levels of education. We assume that 
participants with higher levels of education are 
capable of making more precise self-estimations of 
their counterfactual than participants with lower 
levels. This proposition is motivated by the fact that 
the level of education is positively correlated with 
cognitive abilities (e.g., Falch & Massih, 2010; 
Carlsson, Dahl, Öckert, & Rooth, 2015; Parisi et al., 
2012), which means that on average, individuals 
with higher education levels possess stronger 
cognitive abilities than individuals with lower 
education levels.  
This relationship becomes relevant in the 
context of self-estimating the counterfactual 
because according to Byrne (2005, p. 182), “people 
may create different counterfactual alternatives 
because of differences in their ability to think about 
possibilities of various sorts.” A reason for this 
relationship can be found in the fact that 
counterfactual imagination–the mental creation of 
alternatives to reality–is considered to be a process 
of creative thinking (Byrne, 2005), which in turn 
depends on the level of cognitive abilities (Jauk, 
Benedek, Dunst, & Neubauer, 2013). Under the 
assumption that participants use counterfactual 
thinking as a strategy for crafting their 
counterfactual, we therefore suppose that their 
cognitive abilities are positively correlated with the 
accuracy of their self-estimations. More precisely, 
we assume that lower levels of cognitive abilities 
lead to higher SEB in CSEPP studies.  
Given that participants with higher levels of 
education are supposed to possess stronger 
cognitive skills, and that stronger cognitive skills 
are presumed to enhance the accuracy of self-
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estimated counterfactuals, the first research 
proposition (P1) is formulated as: The higher 
participants’ level of education, the lower the SEB.  
To test this proposition, we applied CSEPP in 
two different populations of participants, one in 
which subjects had a higher level of education and 
one in which they had a lower level.  
 
Dimension 2: Characteristics and Focus of the 
Intervention 
 
The magnitude of SEB may also vary when CSEPP 
is conducted under conditions with various kinds of 
interventions, durations, subject areas, strengths of 
treatment effects, or types of outcome variable 
affected by the intervention (Mueller, Gaus, & Rech, 
2014; Mueller & Gaus, 2015).  
Here we focus on whether CSEPP performs 
equally well when assessing treatment effects on 
various outcome variables. More precisely, we 
tested whether CSEPP delivered estimates of 
varying accuracy when it was applied for estimating 
the effects of the educational film on topic-related 
attitudes and topic-related knowledge. The second 
research proposition (P2) is formulated as: The 
magnitude of SEB differs between CSEPP effect 
estimates on topic-related attitudes and CSEPP 
effect estimates on topic-related knowledge.  
This proposition was inspired by hints in the 
study of Mueller and Gaus (2015) that CSEPP may 
not perform equally well in estimating treatment 
effects on various types of outcome variable. This 
may be the case for two reasons. The first reason 
has to do with the level of difficulty of self-
estimating the counterfactual for a given outcome 
variable. For example, Mueller and Gaus (2015) 
found that CSEPP provided more accurate 
estimates when assessing treatment effects on 
various kinds of attitude than when estimating 
effects on self-reported behavior. The authors 
explain this finding by the fact that behavior is 
determined by a wide variety of factors at both 
individual and macro level, and that it is difficult for 
participants “to reflect all these determinants (and 
the interactions between them) and to weight the 
influence of the treatment” in comparison to these 
key drivers (Mueller and Gaus, 2015) when 
estimating their own counterfactual.  
Based on this reasoning, it seems reasonable to 
presume that CSEPP performs less accurately when 
employed for estimating treatment effects on 
complex outcome variables. Because attitudes 
represent a more complex construct which is 
affected by more determinants than knowledge–
which could make it more difficult to weight the 
influence of the treatment on attitudes in 
comparison to these other determinants–we 
assume that it might be easier for participants to 
estimate their counterfactual for knowledge than 
for attitudes.  
The second reason is rooted in the facts that a 
given treatment may have effects of varying sizes on 
various outcome variables and that these varying 
effect sizes may lead to varied magnitudes of SEB. 
More specifically, we assume that the stronger the 
treatment effect of the intervention under study 
becomes, the less accurate the effect estimates 
provided by CSEPP are. The idea behind this 
assumption has to do with the so-called contrast 
effect, which is one of the mechanisms guiding 
counterfactual thinking. According to Roese (1997, 
p. 140), “contrast effects occur when a judgment is 
made more extreme via the juxtaposition of some 
anchor or standard (Sherif & Hovland, 1961).”  
This reasoning also applies for CSEPP, in which 
the factual state in an outcome variable Y after 
having participated in an intervention may serve as 
an anchor for making a judgment about the 
counterfactual in Y. If the perceived counterfactual 
in Y differs from the factual state, a contrast effect 
may distort counterfactual judgments. For 
example, if a training measure aims to improve 
nurses’ knowledge about a specific hygiene routine, 
they may underrate the level of knowledge they 
would have had without the training because it 
looks smaller in the light of the knowledge gains 
achieved through the training.  
We suppose that with greater perceived 
differences between the factual and the 
counterfactual–that is, with increasing treatment 
effects–participants’ judgments of the 
counterfactual become more extreme because of 
the contrast effect. Consequently, if one of the two 
outcome variables used in this research is more 
strongly affected by the promotion film than the 
other, different strengths of contrast effects might 
lead to differences in the magnitude of SEB.  
 
Dimension 3: Characteristics of the Method 
Used for Data Collection 
 
This dimension comprises attributes of the method 
used for data collection. For example, the 
performance of CSEPP may depend on whether 
data are collected online, in person, or by 
telephone. Moreover, its performance may be 
affected by how questions are phrased or by the 
order of the questions within the questionnaire. In 
this article, we focus on the arrangement of current 
and counterfactual ratings within the questionnaire 
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and test proposition P3: The closer the proximity of 
current and counterfactual ratings within the 
questionnaire, the larger the SEB.  
This proposition is based on the idea that the 
close proximity of factual and counterfactual 
ratings within the questionnaire increases the 
likelihood that participants will (consciously or 
unconsciously) manipulate their self-estimated 
counterfactual ratings. A theoretical justification of 
this assumption can be found in the literature on 
retrospective pretest methodology. For example, 
Nimon, Zigarmi, and Allen (2011, p. 9) note that 
placing current and retrospective items side-by-
side and asking participants to rate the 
retrospective items relative to their current 
responses “creates a contextual effect in which 
participants attend to the contrast between the two 
ratings.” As a consequence of the direct 
juxtaposition of current and retrospective items, 
participants may provide biased retrospective 
ratings, for example, because of implicit theories of 
change, impression management, or effort 
justification (e.g., Hill & Betz, 2005; Taylor, Russ-
Eft, & Taylor, 2009). This means that participants 
may report a change in an outcome variable 
because they expected a change (even if there 
wasn’t any effect at all), they may report biased 
ratings in order to present themselves in 
accordance with perceived norms or mores, or they 
may provide biased ratings in order to justify the 
time and effort they have spent participating. The 
same reasoning applies for CSEPP studies in which 
current and counterfactual ratings may be set in 
close proximity to each other.  
To prevent manipulation, Nimon et al. (2011, p. 
25) suggest that participants complete separate 
surveys for rating current and retrospective items, 
and they recommend the use of survey procedures 
that “inhibit participants from being able to refer to 
the posttest while completing the [retrospective 
pretest].” Administering separate surveys for 
current and counterfactual ratings would also be a 
potential option in CSEPP studies. Doing this, 
however, eliminates one of the great advantages of 
CSEPP in evaluation practice, namely the necessity 
of collecting data at one point in time only. A 
“milder” version of inhibiting participants from 
being able to refer to the current ratings while 
completing counterfactual ratings would be to 
separate current and counterfactual items within 
the same questionnaire, for example, by ensuring 
that the former are completed at the beginning and 
the latter at the end. Between the two blocks of 
items, participants can answer several other 
questions, which may provide room for various 
thoughts, reduce contextual effects, and prevent 
manipulation of counterfactual ratings. 
To test whether this assumption holds and 
whether CSEPP performs equally well under two 
conditions of proximity of current and 
counterfactual ratings, we used two types of 
questionnaire in this study. In one of these, current 
and counterfactual ratings were completed directly 
one after the other at the beginning of the 
questionnaire; In the other, the current ratings 
were completed at the beginning and the 
counterfactual ratings at the end of the 
questionnaire, while several other questions were 




This section describes the data and methods used 
for testing whether CSEPP performed equally well 
under various conditions of educational level, 




The treatment used in this research was a short 
educational videoi of seven minutes’ length. In this 
German-language video, the audience is educated 
about important concepts and aspects of organ 
donation. It provides information about various 
types of organ donation, explains how the system of 
organ donation is organized in Germany and other 
parts of Europe, and compares willingness to 
donate organs in Germany with that in other 
countries. The contents of the video are illustrated 
using the example of an animated character named 
Paul. Besides catchy pictures and charts, there is a 
narrator who explains all the important aspects of 
the topic. The primary objective of the video is to 
inform the audience about the issue of organ 
donation in a comprehensible way. However, it also 
tackles the question of the importance of organ 
donation and encourages recipients to get an organ 




Testing whether participants’ educational level, the 
type of outcome variable, and the question order 
are correlated with SEB in CSEPP studies requires 
information about the magnitude of SEB, 
participants’ educational level, the type of outcome 
variable, and the question order. If it is of interest 
whether participants’ level of education affects 
SEB, for example, their individual values of SEB 
have to be correlated with their level of education. 
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Determining SEB at individual level, however, 
requires participants’ individual treatment effects 
estimated by CSEPP to be compared with their 
respective true individual treatment effects, the 
difference between which equals SEB. 
Unfortunately, true individual treatment effects 
cannot be observed directly, which is why 
estimating SEB at participant level is difficult.  
One way of approximating true treatment 
effects at the individual level is to use participants’ 
pretest values in the outcome as estimates of their 
true counterfactual and to employ the difference 
between participants’ current and pretest ratings as 
a benchmark for assessing the accuracy of 
individual effects estimated by CSEPP. The internal 
validity of this approach, however, may be low 
because of testing effects. Administering a pretest 
prior to the intervention may affect counterfactual 
self-estimations after the intervention because 
participants might be able to remember their 
pretest values and adjust their counterfactual 
ratings accordingly. Thus, it would not be the 
accuracy of self-estimated counterfactuals that was 
tested, but participants’ ability to remember their 
pretest ratings. However, this problem could be 
solved by adding a parallel test such as would be 
carried out in a Solomon four-group design, for 
example. 
We followed a different approach in this study. 
Another viable strategy to circumvent the problem 
is to estimate the average SEB by comparing the 
average treatment effect estimated by CSEPP with 
the average treatment effect estimated by a 
simultaneously conducted RCT within the same 
trial. The idea behind this strategy is that RCTs–
given they are properly conducted–deliver 
unbiased estimates of true causal treatment effects 
and thus serve as valid benchmarks for assessing 
the performance of non-experimental methods 
(Cook, Shadish, & Wong, 2008). Consequently, the 
deviation of the average treatment effect estimated 
by CSEPP from the average treatment effect 
estimated by an RCT within the same trial can be 
employed as an estimate of SEB at trial level.  
Yet, this approach is still not sufficient for 
testing whether participants’ educational level, the 
type of outcome variable, and the question order 
affect the magnitude of SEB. This is because one 
single value of SEB estimated in a single trial cannot 
be correlated with any independent variables. An 
approach to solving this problem is to conduct 
several trials and analyze the relationships between 
SEB and the manipulated conditions in 
participants’ educational level, the type of outcome 
variable, and the question order at trial level. We 
followed this strategy and conducted 40 small 
trialsii, each including a comparison of the effects of 
the same treatment estimated by CSEPP and a 
simultaneously conducted RCT. In total, we 
therefore obtained 40 varying values of potential 
SEB (Δ), one for each trial. In manipulating the 
conditions in participants’ educational level, the 
type of outcome variable, and the question order 
across the 40 trials, we were able to assess whether 
differences in Δ across the trials could be explained 
by the manipulation of the conditions under which 
CSEPP was applied. Hence, instead of conducting 
one large trial for testing the overall performance of 
CSEPP, we simulated how CSEPP performed under 
varying conditions by applying it in 40 small trials 
with various groups of participants, various types of 
outcome variable, and various questionnaire 
orders.  
With regard to participants’ educational level, a 
trial took the value 1 if it was conducted in a group 
of people with a higher level of educationiii–people 
who had at least passed the abituriv–and the value 
0 if it took place in a group of participants with a 
lower level of educationv–people who, at best, held 
a certificate from a realschulevi. Further, the value 1 
in the variable “type of outcome variable” stands for 
trials where topic-related attitudes were the 
outcome variable, and the value 0 means that topic-
related knowledge was employed as the outcome 
measure. Finally, with respect to question order, a 
trial received the value 1 if the current and the self-
estimated counterfactual ratings were in close 
proximity to each other, and it received the value 0 
if they were set apart within the questionnaire.  
Because participants’ educational level, 
outcome variable, and question order were 
dichotomous, there were 23  (8) possible 
combinations of the values of these variables. To 
ensure balance over the 40 trials, each of the eight 
combinations was assigned a lottery ticket. For each 
ticket, five trials were conducted. Prior to the start 
of each trial, a ticket was randomly drawn without 
replacement and the trial was implemented as 
specified by the ticket drawn. This procedure was 
repeated until five trials had been conducted for 
each ticket. The variable combinations of the eight 
tickets are presented in Figure 1. 
Whereas the lottery procedure ensured proper 
randomization of the conditions in the type of 
outcome variable and the question order at trial 
level, we were not able to manipulate participants’ 
educational level directly, instead letting chance 
decide whether a trial was to be conducted in a 
group of subjects with a higher or a lower level of 
education. Hence, educational groups may not only 
have varied in their level of education but also with 
respect to other variables that may be conducive to 
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SEB. In order to reduce this threat of confounding, 
several covariates that could vary between the 




In total, 800 individuals were recruited for 
participation in the 40 trials via a German 
crowdsourcing portal. Each participant received a 
monetary incentive of 0.40 EUR (approx. 0.50 
USD) for completing the whole questionnaire. 
Responding to all items in the questionnaire was 
mandatory.vii All the questionnaires were issued in 
German. Participants were assured of anonymity. 
The empirical work reported in this paper complied 
with relevant ethical standards for human subjects 
protections. Figure 1 provides a summary of the 
cornerstones of the data collection.   
 
Except for the manipulation of participants’ 
educational level, outcome variable, and question 
order, the 40 trials were implemented in exactly the 
same manner. Each of the 40 trials was conducted 
with 20 participants who were randomly assigned 
to a treatment and a control group. Ten participants 
received the treatment and ten were members of 
the control group and did not receive the treatment. 
Members of the control group started the online 
questionnaire by rating a list of items for measuring 
the outcome variable specified by the ticket drawn 
(either topic-related attitudes or knowledge). 
Subsequently, they provided information on their 
age and gender.   
Members of the treatment group started by 
watching the promotion film. Afterwards, they were 
asked about their current state in the outcome 
variable (depending on the ticket drawn, which was 
either topic-related knowledge or attitudes). 
Members of the treatment group in trials where the 
question order took the value 1 were then asked to 
estimate their individual counterfactual in the 
respective outcome variableviii. Subsequently, they 
were asked to provide information on five 
covariates. In contrast, treatment group members 
in trials where the question order took the value 0 
did not estimate their own counterfactual until they 
had provided information on the five covariates. On 
the last page of the questionnaire, all members of 
the treatment group provided information on their 




For measuring the dependent variables, two multi-
item measures were used. Topic-related attitudes 
were measured by nine items that had to be rated 
on a scale from zero (totally disagree) to six (totally 
agree). Similarly, topic-related knowledge was 
captured by ten items that were assessed on the 
same rating scale. For statistical analyses, the 
average item scores of the respective 7-point rating 
scales were used. The items of both measures were 
based on an online questionnaire by Lilie, Hübner, 
Mohs, and Vogel (http://sozpsy-
forschung.psych.uni-
halle.de/organspendefragebogen). 
Five control variables were also included in the 
treatment group questionnaire to adjust for 
systematic differences between the educational 
groups. First, we developed a five-item construct 
for capturing participants’ personal involvement in 
the topic of the intervention (e.g., Celsi & Olson, 
1988) because there may be differences in this 
construct between the educational groups. Second, 
a six-item construct measured treatment sympathy, 
which may also be distributed differently across the 
educational groups. Third, we borrowed six items 
from Krell (2015) to measure mental effort to adjust 
for differences between the educational groups in 
regards to potential effort justification bias. Fourth, 
we used a scale from Musch, Brockhaus, and Bröder 
(2002) to measure impression management as 
differences in effect estimates between the 
educational groups may be confounded by different 
tendencies of socially desirable response. This scale 
is a German ten-item version of the impression 
management scale of Paulhus’ ‘Balanced Inventory 
of Desirable Responding’ (Paulhus, 1992). All the 
items of involvement, treatment sympathy, mental 
effort, and impression management were rated on 
seven-point rating scales ranging from zero (totally 
disagree) to six (totally agree). The mean item 
scores of the 7-point rating scales were used for 
statistical analyses.  
Finally, participants were asked whether they 
possessed an organ donor card. People with an 
Figure 1. Cornerstones of Data Collection 
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organ donor card are supposed to be more 
experienced with the topic, and there may be 
differences in the proportion of donor card holders 
between the educational groups.  
Descriptive statistics of all measures are 
presented in Table 1. A list of all the items showing 




Prior to the main data analysis, we assessed 
whether the effect of the educational film was 
different for the two outcome variables attitudes 
and knowledge. We calculated standardized mean 
differences between the current ratings in the 
treatment and control groups (Cohen’s d) and the 
respective standard errors of d for each of the 40 
trials, and used those values to estimate pooled 
effect sizes by random-effects meta-analysis (e.g., 
Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010). 
The pooled effect size was d = 1.27 (95% CI [1.05, 
1.49]) for trials with knowledge as the outcome, 
indicating a strong effect. In contrast, there was 
only a weak effect on attitudes with a pooled effect 
size of d = 0.32 (95% CI [0.12, 0.52]). Consequently, 
differences observed in the performance of CSEPP 
for estimating effects on attitudes and knowledge 
may indeed be a mixture of various levels of 
difficulty of self-estimating the counterfactual for 
the two measures and differences in the sizes of 
treatment effects on them.  
In the section that follows, we present the seven 
steps of the main analysis. 
Step 1. We estimated Cohen’s d for each of the 
40 trials by using both the RCT (dRCT) and CSEPP 
(dCSEPP). Effect sizes dRCT for independent samples 
were estimated on the basis of differences in mean 
values between the current ratings in the treatment 
and control groups. Effect sizes dCSEPP were 
estimated on the basis of differences in mean values 
between treatment group members’ current and 
counterfactual ratings. Here, we also employed 
effect sizes for independent samples because using 
effect sizes for dependent samples would have led 
to an overestimation of dCSEPP (Dunlap, Cortina, 
Vaslow, & Burke, 1996) and prevented 
comparability of dCSEPP and dRCT.  
Step 2. To assess differences between the 
effects estimated by CSEPP and those estimated by 
the RCT, we calculated the difference between the 
two effect sizes (Δ) for every trial by subtracting 
dRCT from dCSEPP. Thus, Δ represents an estimate for 
SEB at trial level. A positive value of Δ stands for an 
overestimation of the RCT effect by CSEPP in a 
given trial, whilst a negative value of Δ stands for an 
underestimation. As a result of this step, we 
obtained 40 values of Δ, one for each trial.   
Step 3. Because Δ is not a fixed value at trial 
level but is affected by random error within every 
trial, this source of uncertainty has to be taken into 
account in further analyses. In order to assess 
uncertainty within the single trials, we estimated 
standard errors for each value of Δ by using 
bootstrap resampling (Efron, 1979). In every trial, 
we drew 1,000 random samples from the original 
sample and re-estimated the effect sizes dRCT and 
dCSEPP as well as the respective differences Δ for 
each of the 1,000 samples. From the resulting 
sample distributions of Δ, we were able to derive 
standard errors of Δ for each of the 40 trials.      
Step 4. Based on the 40 values of Δ and their 
respective standard errors we conducted an overall 
random-effects meta-analysis in order to obtain a 
pooled estimate of Δ. We used random-effects 
meta-analysis because the 40 trials were not 
implemented under the same conditions; that is, 
they were conducted in two different educational 
populations, with two different outcome measures, 
and with two different question orders in the 
questionnaire. For the calculations, we used the 
Stata module metan (Harris et al., 2008). A 
prospective power analysis, based on the formulae 
provided by Valentine, Pigott, and Rothstein 
(2010), revealed that the meta-analysis had an 
estimated power of .87 for detecting a small effect 
(Cohen’s d=.35) with an assumed moderate degree 
of heterogeneity (τ2=1.0) at an α-level of .05 (two-
sided test).ix 
Step 5. Because participants’ educational level 
may be correlated with other potential 
determinants of Δ, differences in Δ between the two 
educational groups may not only be the 
consequence of educational status but also of other 
variables not controlled for by randomization. To 
adjust for systematic differences between 
educational groups in further analyses, we 
estimated a propensity score (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 
1983) on the basis of the covariates topic 
involvement, mental effort, treatment sympathy, 
impression management, organ donor card, age, 
and gender. This propensity score is defined as the 
conditional probability of a trial being conducted in 
a group of participants with a higher level of 
education given the trial-level mean values of the 
covariates. For estimating the propensity score, we 
used logistic regression. McFadden’s Pseudo R2  
was .42, suggesting that the groups did indeed 
differ in regard to the covariates.  





















































































1/1 - - - 3.41 (1.05) 3.14 (0.64) 
3.69 
(0.96) 3.42 (1.22) 4.37 (1.11) 
3.42 
(1.20) 2.71 (0.65) 20 25.2 (4.44) 
31.0 
(13.73) 80 40 
1/2 - - - 3.62 (0.74) 3.19 (0.95) 
3.27 
(1.20) 2.74 (1.47) 4.87 (0.52) 
4.35 
(1.09) 2.51 (1.31) 20 28.1 (6.30) 
33.5 
(14.27) 90 60 
1/3 - - - 3.91 (0.79) 3.60 (0.87) 
3.23 
(0.88) 4.06 (0.76) 4.68 (0.72) 
3.15 
(1.43) 2.51 (0.92) 50 25.2 (5.69) 
34.5 
(12.60) 70 70 
1/4 - - - 3.62 (0.78) 3.37 (0.78) 
3.06 
(0.97) 3.22 (1.54) 4.65 (0.86) 
4.20 




(14.39) 60 60 
1/5 - - - 3.42 (1.72) 3.29 (1.42) 
3.84 
(0.76) 2.84 (2.12) 4.90 (0.72) 
4.07 




(9.38) 70 60 
2/1 4.92 (0.55) 3.87 (1.30) 4.02 (0.88) - - - 3.44 (1.12) 4.68 (0.79) 3.70 (0.98) 2.76 (1.25) 40 25.9 (7.37) 
29.1 
(14.37) 50 80 
2/2 5.50 (0.44) 4.55 (1.30) 3.88 (1.21) - - - 3.66 (1.51) 4.65 (0.38) 4.10 (1.47) 2.96 (0.75) 40 27.1 (6.71) 
27.5 
(7.79) 60 80 
2/3 5.46 (0.51) 4.13 (1.31) 3.69 (1.17) - - - 3.00 (1.74) 5.38 (0.62) 4.88 (0.66) 2.49 (0.96) 40 27.8 (8.02) 
31.9 
(12.81) 50 50 




(13.48) 50 70 
2/5 5.00 (0.52) 4.03 (0.95) 3.73 (1.07) - - - 3.38 (1.54) 4.93 (0.55) 3.52 (1.30) 3.16 (0.86) 50 25.9 (9.80) 
27.4 
(10.21) 80 60 




(7.78) 60 80 




(13.57) 50 50 




(8.22) 70 70 




(4.00) 60 50 
3/5 5.32 (0.60) 4.12 (1.04) 4.33 (1.08) - - - 4.14 (1.08) 4.87 (0.67) 4.22 (1.02) 2.82 (1.08) 60 29.0 (9.04) 
26.5 
(9.59) 40 60 
4/1 - - - 3.04 (0.76) 2.98 (1.01) 
3.23 
(1.04) 3.18 (1.91) 4.20 (1.03) 
4.05 
(1.52) 2.26 (1.08) 40 30.2 (8.75) 
31.1 
(10.34) 50 50 
4/2 - - - 3.64 (1.12) 3.54 (0.67) 
3.44 
(0.93) 3.24 (1.59) 4.37 (1.16) 
3.85 




(6.75) 30 60 
4/3 - - - 3.59 (1.11) 3.27 (1.00) 
3.32 
(0.82) 3.40 (1.29) 4.23 (1.06) 
3.90 




(11.17) 40 40 
4/4 - - - 3.87 (0.92) 3.51 (0.71) 
3.19 
(0.95) 3.92 (1.54) 4.70 (0.83) 
3.95 
(1.02) 3.12 (0.52) 60 27.9 (8.77) 
34.1 
(9.96) 50 50 
4/5 - - - 3.21 (1.26) 3.43 (1.17) 
3.19 
(0.44) 3.30 (1.44) 4.80 (0.91) 
3.40 




(4.09) 50 90 
5/1 - - - 3.46 (0.94) 2.98 (1.10) 
3.01 
(0.75) 3.58 (1.44) 4.03 (1.35) 
3.78 
(1.19) 2.99 (0.77) 30 35.1 (9.28) 
30.2 
(8.16) 30 40 
5/2 - - - 4.12 (0.76) 3.59 (0.69) 
2.86 
(0.91) 3.14 (1.35) 4.40 (1.01) 
4.35 




(8.27) 50 60 
5/3 - - - 4.26 (0.94) 4.16 (1.12) 
3.61 
(0.71) 4.20 (1.48) 5.35 (0.78) 
3.57 




(8.25) 50 50 




5/4 - - - 3.87 (0.85) 2.86 (0.63) 
3.30 
(0.82) 3.38 (1.52) 4.73 (0.88) 
3.03 




(10.35) 40 40 
5/5 - - - 4.36 (0.83) 3.83 (1.08) 
3.69 
(0.88) 3.90 (2.21) 4.62 (1.54) 
3.08 




(4.92) 40 60 




(10.79) 70 70 




(12.44) 70 80 




(17.46) 40 80 




(14.54) 60 50 




(14.35) 80 60 
7/1 - - - 3.92 (0.93) 3.90 (0.97) 
3.37 
(1.08) 3.44 (1.68) 5.38 (0.69) 
3.77 




(8.82) 70 40 
7/2 - - - 3.77 (1.01) 3.50 (0.92) 
3.57 
(0.66) 3.50 (1.64) 4.95 (0.90) 
3.52 




(10.63) 50 60 
7/3 - - - 3.48 (0.72) 3.28 (0.80) 
3.87 
(0.94) 3.34 (1.48) 4.80 (0.98) 
3.43 




(18.05) 80 50 
7/4 - - - 3.22 (1.26) 2.78 (1.22) 
3.50 
(1.23) 3.08 (1.87) 4.58 (1.16) 
3.80 
(1.20) 3.00 (0.65) 30 30.1 (9.24) 
34.6 
(13.32) 60 40 
7/5 - - - 3.91 (0.97) 3.59 (0.84) 
3.74 
(1.23) 3.16 (1.24) 4.72 (1.17) 
3.32 




(10.70) 80 30 




(13.18) 70 50 




(11.02) 30 70 
8/3 4.80 (1.24) 2.96 (1.48) 3.47 (1.00) - - - 3.18 (1.68) 5.28 (0.99) 4.33 (1.20) 2.75 (1.30) 20 33.4 (9.45) 
43.1 
(12.38) 40 20 




(8.15) 50 80 




(14.03) 60 90 
α .90 .88 .83 .73 .71 .72 .88 .81 .75 .68 - - - - - 
 
Note. Ticket/Trial = ticket number/trial number. Ticket 1: question order = 1, type of outcome variable = 1, educational level = 1. Ticket 2: question order = 1, type 
of outcome variable = 0, educational level = 1. Ticket 3: question order = 0, type of outcome variable = 0, educational level = 1. Ticket 4: question order = 0, type of 
outcome variable = 1, educational level = 1. Ticket 5: question order = 1, type of outcome variable = 1, educational level = 0. Ticket 6: question order = 1, type of 
outcome variable = 0, educational level = 0. Ticket 7: question order = 0, type of outcome variable = 1, educational level = 0. Ticket 8: question order = 0, type of 
outcome variable = 0, educational level = 0. α = Cronbach’s alpha. Except Organ Donor Card and Male, values represent arithmetic means (standard deviations are 
in parentheses). 




Step 6. We conducted random-effects meta-
regression in order to gain deeper insights into the  
effects of participants’ educational level, the type of 
outcome variable, and the question order on Δ. 
Participants’ educational level, the type of outcome 
variable, and the question order were included in 
the regression equation as three binary predictors  
whereas Δ was the dependent variable. Further, we 
also included the estimated propensity score as a 
covariate in the model to adjust for systematic 
differences between the educational groups. For 
conducting meta-regression, we used the Stata 
module metareg (Harbord & Higgins, 2008).  
Step 7. In the last step, we examined the 
predicted values of Δ in order to assess whether 
certain combinations of participants’ educational 
level, the type of outcome variable, and the question 
order led to significant over- or underestimations of 





The results of the overall meta-analysis (Step 4) are 
presented in a forest plot (see Figure 2). The bold 
vertical line in figure 2 represents the null effect, 
which means that there is no difference between the 
effect sizes estimated by CSEPP and the 
simultaneously conducted RCT. The numbers 
presented below the horizontal line at the bottom of 
the plot represent standardized effect size 
differences in terms of Cohen’s d. Within the plot 
region, each horizontal line (including small dots 
and boxes) represents a separate trial being 
analyzed by the meta-analysis. Each of these trials 
consists of three components: point estimates of Δ 
represented by the small black dots, grey boxes 
representing the weight each trial is given by 
random effects meta-analysis, and a bold horizontal 
line representing the 95% confidence interval of the 
respective point estimate, with each end of the line 
representing the boundaries of the confidence 
interval. Further, the diamond in the last row of the 
plot region represents the confidence interval when 
all the individual trials are combined. Finally, the 
dashed vertical line represents the point estimate of 
the combined individual trials.  
As can be seen, there is some variation between 
the single trials with respect to the values of Δ. Yet, 
the statistical estimates suggest that this variation 
is almost completely determined by random noise 
because the estimated between-trial variation is τ2 
< 0.01 and the estimated variation in Δ attributable 
to heterogeneity is I2 < 0.01%, χ2 = 21.69 (df 39), p 
= .989. Moreover, the pooled difference of Δ = -0.12 
(95% CI [-0.32, 0.08]) is very small and does not 
differ significantly from zero.  
Taken together, these results provide two 
important insights. First, the small value of the 
pooled Δ indicates that overall, using CSEPP for 
estimating treatment effects did not lead to 
systematic over- or underestimation when 
compared with an RCT. Second, the estimated 
between-trial variance close to zero suggests that 
values of Δ do not systematically vary between 
trials, despite the fact that these were conducted 
within various educational groups, with various 
outcome variables, and with various question 
orders in the questionnaire.  
To gain more detailed insights into the effects 
of participants’ educational level, the type of 
outcome variable, and the question order on Δ, an 
examination of the findings of the meta-regression 
(Step 6) is required. The estimation results support 
the assumption that none of the independent 
variables had an effect on Δ.x The joint test for all 
predictors was not significant, F (4, 35) = 0.64, p = 
.637. The same is true for the individual effects. The 
predictors’ coefficients were b = 0.20 (95% CI [-
0.37, 0.76]) for participants’ educational level, b = 
0.21 (95% CI [-0.21, 0.63]) for the type of outcome 
variable, b = -0.20 (95% CI [-0.61, 0.21]) for the 
question order, and b = -0.07 (95% CI [-0.87, 0.74]) 
for the propensity score. The intercept was a = -
0.22 (95% CI [-0.71, 0.27]).  
 Finally, Figure 3 presents the predicted values 
of Δ for the eight tickets (Step 7), represented by the 
small diamonds in the plot region. The 
corresponding horizontal lines represent the 
respective 95% confidence intervals of the 
predicted values of Δ for each ticket, with each end 
of the line representing the boundaries of the 
confidence interval. In terms of effect sizes, four of 
the predicted values of Δ are below |0.2|, suggesting 
very small deviations of CSEPP estimates from RCT 
estimates within the respective tickets. Further, 
three other tickets show predicted values of Δ 
ranging between |0.2| and |0.3|, still representing 
small deviations. Only one of the fitted values 
(Ticket 6) exceeded the value |0.4|, indicating a 
small to medium deviation. Yet none of the 
predicted values differed significantly from zero. 
Consequently, there is not much evidence that 
specific combinations of the conditions in 
participants’ educational level, the type of outcome 
variable, and the question order facilitate SEB.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Δ. 
 
Note. ID = Ticket/trial. ∆ = Difference between effect sizes of CSEPP and RCT estimation. CI = Confidence interval of ∆. % Weight = Weights estimated by random 
effects meta-analysis. Overall = Pooled ∆.
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/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/2: question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/3: question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/4: question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/5: question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/1: question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/2: question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/3: question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/4: question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/5: question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/1: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/2: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/3: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/4: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/5: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = low. 
/1: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/2: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/3: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/4: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/5: question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = low. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high  
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high  
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high  
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high  
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = knowledge; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high  
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high  
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = set apart; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
/ : question order = close; type of outcome variable = attitudes; educational level = high. 
veral
I                             Conditions of Single Trials          Distribution of Δ




Figure 3. Predicted Value of Δ. 
Note. Predicted values of ∆ under control of the propensity score (held constant at its mean). 




The results indicate that using CSEPP did not lead 
to biased estimates of treatment effects when 
compared with a simultaneously conducted RCT. 
This finding confirms the results from previous 
studies (Mueller, Gaus, & Rech, 2014; Mueller & 
Gaus, 2015). 
Furthermore, the estimated between-trial 
variation is close to zero, suggesting that values of 
Δ do only randomly vary. A between-trial variation 
of close to zero is not very common in meta-
analyses because trials are usually conducted by 
various researchers, with various populations, 
and/or under various conditions. In the present 
study, however, all of the 40 trials were 
implemented in an identical manner except for the 
three variables manipulated. The absence of 
systematic between-trial variation thus leads to two 
insights. First, the idea of conducting every single 
trial under the same conditions seems to have 
worked out quite well. Second, if the manipulated 
variables had had any effect on the performance of 
CSEPP at all, the estimated between-trial variation 
would have been much higher than it was in our 
study. Thus, the results of our analyses clearly 
support the rejection of research propositions P1, 
P2, and P3. The important question in this regard is 
why.  
Regarding the relationship between 
participants’ educational level and Δ, results show 
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that there is not much evidence for claiming an 
effect of participants’ educational level on Δ. A first 
explanation for this finding is that the assumptions 
behind P1 are wrong, which means that there is 
either no correlation between the level of education 
and cognitive abilities, or that there is no 
correlation between cognitive abilities and SEB, or 
both. Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine 
which of the two assumptions may have been 
violated because cognitive abilities were not 
measured in this study. 
The non-significant effect of participants’ 
educational level on Δ may also have resulted 
because participants did not use counterfactual 
thinking for crafting their own counterfactual, but 
retrospective thinking instead. Given the short 
duration of the treatment, this is not an unlikely 
scenario. Thus, subjects may have tried to 
reconstruct the past for crafting their 
counterfactual instead of creating alternatives to 
reality. If this is the case, SEB may actually equal 
recall bias, a bias to which individuals are liable 
when they attempt to reconstruct the past, for 
example due to problems of remembering. Previous 
work has shown that recall bias is unrelated to 
education (Croyle et al., 2006), which may thus 
explain the absence of a significant effect of 
participants’ educational level on Δ in this case.  
A further explanation is related to selection 
bias. Because participants’ educational level could 
not be randomized, unobserved third variables that 
are distributed differently between the educational 
groups may be responsible for confounding. Hence, 
although this threat to internal validity was reduced 
by including the propensity score in the analysis, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that omitted 
variables are responsible for the non-significant 
effect of participants’ educational level.  
Regarding the relationship between the type of 
outcome variable and Δ, the meta-regression did 
not show a significant relationship either. A first 
reason for this finding may be found in the absence 
of a contrast effect. When presenting P2, we argued 
that contrast effects may become stronger with 
increasing treatment effects, leading to increasing 
bias in counterfactual self-estimations. Yet this 
assumption may be incorrect and the presumed 
contrast effects may not apply.  
A second potential explanation for the absence 
of a significant effect of the type of outcome variable 
on Δ in the meta-regression is that the two outcome 
measures are too similar in terms of difficulty for 
self-estimating the counterfactual. This means the 
assumption that it is easier for participants to 
estimate their counterfactual for knowledge than it 
is for attitudes may be false. A different explication 
of the absent effect may be that CSEPP is robust 
against varying levels of difficulty for self-
estimating the counterfactual. This interpretation, 
however, would contradict previous findings that 
suggested CSEPP performed less well in cases 
where self-estimation of the counterfactual appears 
to be more difficult (Mueller & Gaus, 2015). 
Finally, a third reason for the non-significant 
coefficient of the type of outcome variable in the 
meta-regression may be that varying levels of 
difficulty for self-estimating the counterfactual in 
the two outcome measures and varying strengths of 
treatment effects had effects on Δ in the opposite 
direction and thus canceled each other out. This is 
not unlikely given the fact that we assumed that 
bias due to the contrast effect is larger when 
estimating effects on knowledge and that bias due 
to the level of difficulty of self-estimating the 
counterfactual is larger when effects on attitudes 
are estimated. Unfortunately, it is not possible to 
separate the effects of various sizes of contrast 
effects and various levels of difficulty. 
 Another non-significant relationship was found 
between the question order and Δ. Here too, a first 
and simple explanation for this finding is that the 
assumptions behind P3 are incorrect. We assumed 
that when current and counterfactual ratings are 
positioned directly one after the other, participants 
tend to manipulate counterfactual ratings. 
However, the fact that participants received a 
monetary incentive for participation in the study 
may be responsible for a weakening of the tendency 
to manipulate because of a possible sense of duty.  
 Moreover, if close proximity of current and 
counterfactual ratings within the questionnaire 
promotes participants’ tendency to manipulate 
because of implicit theories of change, effort 
justification, or social desirability, these sources of 
bias actually have to be present. However, this may 
not have been the case in this research. The 
distorting effect of implicit theories of change, for 
example, becomes problematic only if participants 
expect to change because of an intervention. 
Because the educational video was a low-threshold 
intervention of short duration, participants may, 
however, not have expected to change with regard 
to knowledge or attitudes at all. Moreover, because 
watching a short video is not very tiring, the 
tendency to justify the effort spent on watching the 
video is presumably low. Consequently, effort 
justification bias was probably not a big issue. 
Finally, because social desirability bias is usually 
low in anonymous interview situations (e.g., 
Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000), it may not 
have fostered manipulations of counterfactual 
ratings when current and counterfactual ratings 
were requested directly one after the other.      
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 These explanations are supported by the results 
of the meta-regression. Under control of 
participants’ educational level, the type of outcome 
variable, and the propensity score, the predicted 
value of Δ was -0.07 for trials in which the current 
and counterfactual ratings were placed side by side 
and -0.27 for trials where the ratings were 
separated within the questionnaire. This means 
that CSEPP underestimated the magnitude of 
treatment effects, no matter whether current and 
counterfactual ratings were completed directly one 
after the other or not. Because implicit theories of 
change, effort justification, and social desirability 
predominantly lead to the overestimation of 
treatment effects (e.g., Hill & Betz, 2005), it seems 
that these factors did not have an impact in this 
research.  
Although CSEPP provided relatively accurate 
estimates regardless of the condition under which 
it was applied, it should be noted that CSEPP might 
have performed differently if the independent 
variables used in this study had been manipulated 
in a different way. As regards P1, for example, there 
might have been an effect of participants’ 
educational level on Δ if the two groups had 
consisted of groups of academics and individuals 
holding a certificate of secondary education only, 
because of a greater educational discrepancy. 
Moreover, if one of the outcome variables used had 
measured behavior, CSEPP might have provided 
more varying estimates when used for estimating 
effects on various types of outcome variable. 
Finally, if current and counterfactual ratings had 
been completed in two separate surveys (two weeks 
apart, for example) we might have found effects of 
the question order on Δ.   
Consequently, the fact that the independent 
variables did not have significant effects in this 
particular research project does not imply that they 
would not have had effects with other 
specifications.   
 
Conclusion and Implications for Further 
Research 
 
The research reported in this article was devoted to 
investigating the validity of CSEPP for assessing 
treatment effects when it is applied in various 
educational groups, with various outcome 
variables, and with various question orders in the 
questionnaire. The results of a comparison between 
CSEPP and RCT estimates showed that CSEPP 
delivered relatively resilient estimates of the effects 
of a YouTube video about organ donation on topic-
related attitudes and knowledge, no matter under 
what conditions it was used.  
When interpreting the results, one has to be 
aware of the fact that they only hold under the 
conditions examined and cannot easily be 
generalized. Limitations on external validity arise 
from various sources. For example, we worked with 
non-randomly sampled participants from a 
crowdsourcing platform only, which is why we do 
not know whether CSEPP would perform 
differently when used in various populations, such 
as the actual target population of the YouTube 
video. Moreover, the treatment was of very short 
duration. It is conceivable that CSEPP would have 
performed less satisfactorily with longer 
treatments. Further, the viability of CSEPP was 
only tested for assessing the effects of watching a 
film, which is why we cannot draw any inferences 
about whether CSEPP would have provided 
comparable results if the treatment had been of a 
different kind, such as an in-person communicative 
intervention or a training measure. Also, the 
intervention was about the issue of organ donation 
and we do not know whether CSEPP would have 
performed differently in other topical areas.  
It is also difficult to generalize the results of this 
research study to real-world evaluation settings. 
For example, we do not know whether we would 
have obtained similar results if participants had not 
been volunteers but forced to participate in the 
intervention. Moreover, it is difficult to assess how 
CSEPP would perform if it was not applied directly 
after the intervention but with some delay. 
Although Mueller and Gaus (2015) showed that 
using CSEPP directly after the intervention did not 
lead to results that were substantially different from 
those obtained when using it two weeks later, there 
are currently no instances with longer time lags. 
Therefore, we strongly recommend that the 
performance of CSEPP be tested when it is applied 
a considerable amount of time after the 
intervention. This could also be helpful for 
determining whether CSEPP is appropriate for 
estimating treatment effects that build up 
incrementally over time, as it is unknown whether 
participants are capable of taking increases of 
effects over time into account when estimating their 
own counterfactual.   
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume 
that it is easier for participants to estimate their 
own counterfactual when treatment effects are 
large because there is a visible contrast to their 
current state after the intervention. Yet, this is not 
the case in the present research. If we only consider 
the trials with attitudes as the outcome variable in 
the meta-analysis, we find that the pooled deviation 
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of CSEPP from RCTs is very small at |Δ| = .04. 
Because the overall effect of the educational film on 
attitudes was small at d = .32, we conclude that 
CSEPP was suitable for providing relatively 
accurate estimates despite the fact that the 
treatment effect on attitudes was small.  
Finally, there is some uncertainty regarding the 
degree to which CSEPP is capable of providing 
accurate estimates of complex effects where the 
intervention interacts with or is moderated by other 
variables. Also not clear is the extent to which 
people can anticipate side effects. Investigating 
both of these issues calls for the application of 
controlled study designs, although testing whether 
CSEPP is able to deal with side effects would 
require a wide net to be cast for additional 
outcomes.  
As with other tests of non-experimental 
designs, it is difficult to draw generalizable 
conclusions about the conditions under which a 
method provides unbiased effect estimates. In this 
research, we only tested the effects of three various 
kinds of variable. However, there are many more 
factors that could affect the performance of CSEPP. 
Therefore, we recommend that the viability of 
CSEPP for assessing treatment effects be further 
investigated with more varied settings, treatments, 
and populations in the future. Specifically, we 
recommend that CSEPP be tested in real-world 
evaluations outside the relatively artificial research 
environments in which this research and previous 
studies on CSEPP were conducted.   
Besides aspects of external validity, there are 
other limitations that should be noted. One 
problem concerns the measurement of one of the 
dependent variables, namely self-reported 
knowledge. It is unclear whether self-reported 
improvements in knowledge due to watching the 
educational video really correspond with increases 
in actual knowledge. Although there is evidence 
that self-reported knowledge measured in the 
context of the evaluation of a similar education 
video correlates at least moderately with objective 
knowledge measured by a multiple choice test (e.g., 
Mueller, 2015), this need not be the case in the 
present study. Consequently, we cannot draw any 
inferences as to whether CSEPP would have 
performed differently if respondents’ post-video 
knowledge had been measured objectively by a 
multiple choice quiz.   
Another problematic issue may be seen in the 
small number of cases of the single trials. 
Conducting an experiment with only 20 
participants may lead to serious concerns on the 
part of many researchers. However, our ex-ante 
calculations showed that the overall power of our 
study was sufficient for detecting even small 
deviations of CSEPP from RCT estimates. 
Nevertheless, it would be beneficial to replicate the 
present analyses with one large trial instead of 
many small trials. In this case, however, problems 
related to estimating bias at the individual level 
would have to be solved in a way that was different 
from that employed in the present research.  
Finally, while we tested whether CSEPP was 
capable of estimating unbiased treatment effects, 
we did not focus on validity issues of the self-
estimated counterfactuals. For example, we did not 
assess whether the values of the self-estimated 
counterfactuals provided by respondents were 
actually determined by counterfactual thinking or 
whether respondents used other strategies such as 
retrospective thinking. If the latter was the case, the 
CSEPP method would be virtually the same as the 
retrospective pretest method. As long as the 
treatment effects estimated were unbiased, this 
would not compromise the CSEPP method. 
However, in this case the CSEPP method would 
have to be considered rather as a modification of 
the retrospective pretest and not as a new method 
for estimating treatment effects. Thus, we strongly 
suggest that future research focuses explicitly on 
investigating which cognitive strategies 
respondents actually use for creating their own 
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(A1) “A person who donates organs on death takes responsibility for other people.” 
(A2) “Organ donation gives death some meaning.” 
(A3) “I think the system we have in Germany for the allocation of donor organs is good.” 
(A4) “There is a danger of organs being allocated unfairly.” (r) 
(A5) “I think the way donor organs are allocated in Germany is fair and correct.” 
(A6) “I would feel guilty if I refused to donate my organs on death.” 
(A7) “I don’t feel any personal obligation whatsoever to donate my organs to other people when I die.” (r) 
(A8) “All Germans should have an organ donor card in order to protect their family members from having to 
make a difficult decision when they die.” 
(A9) “I don’t need an organ donor card. That’s a decision my family members can make for me when I die.” 
(r) 
 
Topic-Related Knowledge  
(K1) “I know what is understood by the term ‘organ donation’.” 
(K2) “I know what purpose organ donations fulfill.” 
(K3) “I have some idea of how the organ donation system is organized.”   
(K4) “I know what a ‘post-mortem organ donation’ is.” 
(K5) “I know when a person is pronounced dead in Germany so that an organ can be removed for donation.” 
(K6) “I have some idea of how prepared people are to donate organs in Germany as compared with other 
countries.” 
(K7) “I know what an organ donor card is needed for.” 
(K8) “I know the difference between ‘opt-in’ and ‘opt-out’ consent systems in the context of organ donation.” 
(K9) “I know how recipients of donor organs are selected in Germany.” 
(K10) “I know what a ‘living organ donation’ is.” 
 
Topic Involvement 
(TI1) “The topic of organ donation is one that has been occupying me for a long time.” 
(TI2) “Information on the topic of organ donation is of interest to me as a matter of basic principle.” 
(TI3) “The topic of organ donation has been important to me for a long time.” 
(TI4) “I have already given the topic of organ donation a good deal of consideration.” 
(TI5) “The topic of organ donation doesn’t interest me.” (r) 
 
Treatment Sympathy 
(TS1) “The video was well made.” 
(TS2) “The video was of high quality.” 
(TS3) “The video was informative.” 
(TS4) “I didn’t think much of the video.” (r) 
(TS5) “The video was interesting.” 
(TS6) “The video was boring.” (r) 
 
Mental Effort 
(ME1) “While watching the video I didn’t make much effort to follow the content.” (r) 
(ME2) “I didn’t make any particular effort when I was watching the video.” (r) 
(ME3) “I tried hard to understand everything while I was watching the video.” 
(ME4) “I made a considerable mental effort while watching the video.” 
(ME5) “I didn’t concentrate particularly hard while watching the video.” (r) 
(ME6) “While watching the video I made an effort to follow the content.” 
 
Impression Management 
(IM1) “I sometimes tell lies if I have to.” (r) 
(IM2) “There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.” (r) 
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(IM3) “I never swear.” 
(IM4) “I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.” (r) 
(IM5) “I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.” (r) 
(IM6) “I always declare everything at customs.” 
(IM7) “I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.” (r) 
(IM8) “I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.” (r) 
(IM9) “I never take things that don’t belong to me.” 
(IM10) “I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.” (r) 
 
Note. (r) = Item was recoded for analyses. The scale used to measure impression management was a German short 
form of the impression management scale of Paulhus’ Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR). 
 
 




i  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0LNyK7zB88 
(last accessed on December 22, 2015). 
ii Researchers are recommended to employ at least ten 
trials per covariate in meta-regression models 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). 
Because we included four covariates in our model, we 
conducted 40 trials. 
iii  64.5% of the members of this group had passed the 
abitur; 35.5% held a university degree. 
iv German school examination approximately equivalent 
to the American SAT exam. 
v 1% of the members of this group left school without a 
degree; 4.5% were still in school; 6 % held a certificate of 
secondary education; 63.5% held an intermediate school 
certificate; 25% had completed a vocational training.   
vi German intermediate school certificate. 
vii  Because all items were mandatory, there were no 
missing data.  
viii The exact wording for asking respondents to provide 
self-estimations of their counterfactual was: “Please 
 
imagine that you did not watch the film that you have 
just watched. How would you rate the following items 
then? Please be aware that you must rate these 
statements as you would have rated them if you had 
never seen the film.” 
ix The actual power of the meta-analysis is even higher 
because the assumed degree of heterogeneity was 
substantially overstated in the prospective power 
calculations, as it turned out after data collection. If the 
estimated between-trial variance τ2 was set to zero as 
suggested by the analyses, our meta-analysis had a power 
greater than .88 for detecting an even smaller effect 
(d=.25) at α=.05 (two-sided test). 
x This is also true when the propensity score is removed 
from the model. Although the coefficient of participants’ 
educational level gets somewhat smaller, the other 
coefficients do not change at all. Also, all confidence 
intervals still span the zero value.  
 
																																																								
